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Background and objectives: There is increasing evidence that disgust responding occurs at both a primary
and secondary level in the form of disgust propensity and disgust sensitivity. The unique contributions of
anxiety and disgust need to be established if disgust is to be implicated in the etiology of anxiety
disorders such as obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). The primary objective of the current study was
to develop two separate implicit measures of disgust propensity and sensitivity and to explicate the role
of implicit disgust propensity and sensitivity in avoidance behavior and OC tendencies.
Methods: The current study (N ¼ 33 undergraduate students) utilized a measure of implicit cognition, the
Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP), to independently analyze disgust propensity and
disgust sensitivity. In addition, a series of behavioral approach tasks (BAT) and questionnaires measuring
general disgust, obsessive-compulsive (OC) tendencies and general psychopathology were implemented
to validate the implicit measures.
Results: Disgust sensitivity predicted avoidance behavior on the BATs independent of disgust propensity
and anxiety, while disgust propensity did not. Both disgust propensity and sensitivity predicted self-
reported OC tendencies and individually predicted obsessing and washing concerns, respectively.
Limitations: Our findings are based on a non-clinical student sample and further research is required for
generalization to OCD.
Conclusions: The implicit measures appeared to be measuring two separate constructs and had differ-
ential relationships with behavior and OC tendencies. Overall, the results support current theories
relating to pathological disgust and OCD.
 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Disgust is a universally acknowledged negative emotion
encompassing physiological, cognitive and behavioral domains
(Davey, MacDonald, & Brierley, 2008; Oaten, Stevenson, & Case,
2009). Early theorists treated disgust as repulsion at oral incorpo-
ration, that is, it primarily centered on food-related disgust (Haidt,
McCauley, & Rozin, 1994). Current research indicates that many
other experiences may elicit disgust including body-envelope
violations, animal-related, body-products and socio-moral disgust
(Haidt et al., 1994). Additionally, disgust responding is said to follow
two laws of sympathetic magic: 1) the law of contagion which
holds that there is a permanent transfer of properties from one
object to another, 2) the law of similarity which posits that objects: þ353 1 708 4767.
olson).
All rights reserved.which resemble one another share the same properties (Rozin,
Millman, & Nemeroff, 1986).
The last decade has seen a dramatic increase in disgust-related
research, with the majority of this research conceptualizing disgust
as a unitary response. Recent evidence, however, suggests that
disgust can be separated into two constituents, propensity and
sensitivity. Disgust propensity is an individual’s tendency to
experience disgust while disgust sensitivity is how negatively the
individual appraises their experience of disgust (van Overveld, de
Jong, Peters, Cavanagh, & Davey, 2006). The study of both
constructs is relevant in that it may be useful to measure both how
easily disgusted an individual becomes, and how negatively this
feeling is then appraised (van Overveld et al., 2006). Until recently,
disgust sensitivity (i.e., the secondary appraisal of the initial feeling
of disgust) has been underplayed in the literature with most of the
research focusing on disgust propensity.
Teachman and Saporito (2009) argued that, based on cognitive
models of anxiety, irrational disgust appraisals will likely be
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parallels that of anxiety’s contribution, but many open questions
remain. More specifically, the role of disgust in the etiology of
anxiety disorders such as obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) has
been identified as an important area for future research (Olatunji,
Cisler, McKay, & Phillips, 2010).
Obsessive-compulsive disorder is characterized by recurrent
obsessions or compulsions such as washing or checking, which
result in impaired social and occupational functioning (Wahl et al.,
2010). Davey (2003) posited that in order to determine the extent of
a relationship between disgust and any psychopathology the
mediating effect of anxiety on the relationship needs to be estab-
lished. Thus, it is vital that current levels of anxiety be taken into
account when examining this relationship. Moretz and McKay
(2008) found a direct relationship between a self-reported
predisposition to become disgusted (i.e., disgust propensity1) and
OCD contamination symptoms above and beyond anxiety. Simi-
larly, disgust has been shown to predict general OCD symptoms and
washing concerns independently of anxiety and act as an inter-
vening variable between anxiety and spider fears, blood-injury-
injection (BII) fears and washing concerns (Olatunji et al., 2007).
In recent years, some researchers have begun to employ so
called implicit measures of cognition in the study of psychopa-
thology and anxiety (De Houwer, 2002). Implicit measures have
been described as a means of assessing mental content, often in the
absence of conscious recognition between this content and the
response (Nosek & Greenwald, 2009). The ego-dystonic nature of
anxious phenomenon such as obsessions suggest that they are
involuntary or automatic and this apparent lack of conscious
control over thoughts and feelings that characterizes many
psychopathologies supports the use of implicit measures in this
domain (see Wiers, Teachman, & De Houwer, 2007, for a full
appreciation). According to McNally (1995), at least one type of
cognitive bias encompasses each of the anxiety disorders (e.g.,
attentional or interpretational biases). Problematic disgust
responding appears to be as a result of an information processing
bias (e.g., If it gets all over me, I don’t think I could cope) thus it may
share some of the features of automaticity. The involuntary nature
of this biased processing of environmental cues is viewed as the
trademark of automaticity in anxiety (McNally, 1995; Teachman,
2007; Wiers et al., 2007). As such, it is important to examine
these biases at both the implicit and explicit level in order to attain
a greater understanding of the etiology and preservation of
psychological conditions such as OCD (Wiers et al., 2007).
The Implicit Association Test (IAT) has been utilized to measure
general disgust in relation to spider and snake fear and general
disgust (e.g., Teachman, Gregg, & Woody, 2001, Huijding & de Jong,
2007; Zinkernagel, Hofman, Dislich, Gschwendner, & Schmitt,
2011). Critically, the stimuli used in these studies (e.g., disgusting,
gross, repulsive, dirty) made it likely that the IATs were targeting
primary disgust reactions e that is, disgust propensity. In relation
to measuring disgust sensitivity, the methodology of the IAT gives
rise to difficulties because disgust sensitivity involves appraisal of
an initial feeling and it has been argued that the IAT cannot
accommodate the measurement of such complex conditional
beliefs (De Houwer, 2002). Importantly, in the context of the
current study, a relatively new methodology known as the Implicit
Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP; Barnes-Holmes et al.,
2006; see Nosek, Hawkins, & Frazier, 2011) appears to offer a way1 Moretz and McKay (2008) defined disgust sensitivity as “the trait-like predis-
position of a person to become disgusted” (p.p.707). In keeping with the definitions
set out by van Overveld et al. (2006), this would be conceptualized as disgust
propensity in the current context in that appraisals have no role.of measuring conditional beliefs, at the implicit level (see Hughes,
Barnes-Holmes, & De Houwer, 2011). It has been argued recently
that even propositional processes may possess certain features of
automaticity, and thus the propositional nature of the IRAP does
not, ipso facto, undermine the claim that it is tapping into auto-
matic responses (see Hughes et al., 2011, for a detailed discussion).
Furthermore, the recently offered Relational Elaboration and
Coherence model (REC; Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Stewart, &
Boles, 2010), which underpins the IRAP, assumes that automatic
and strategic responses sit at opposite ends of a continuum rather
constituting separate or dichotomous psychological processes (see
below). As such, the IRAP should allow for the measurement of not
only disgust propensity but also sensitivity, even though the latter
may be a less automatic, or slightly more controlled aspect of
disgust responding, than the former.
A second limitation of the IAT is that the belief under scrutiny is
only measured as a function of its relation to the opposing category
inserted into the IAT. That is, it provides only a relative measure of
implicit cognition (De Houwer, 2003). For instance, in the
Teachman et al. (2001) study faster responding to spider-positive
and snake-negative than to the opposite pattern (i.e., spider-
negative and snake-positive) could be interpreted in various
ways. Participants could (a) like spiders and dislike snakes, (b) they
could dislike spiders and snakes, but the latter are disliked more
than the former or (c) they could like spiders and snakes, but the
former are liked more than the latter. This disadvantage is partic-
ularly relevant to the study of constructs such as spider fear and
disgust as they have no generally accepted dichotomous relation-
ship with another construct to provide an appropriate contrasting
category (Teachman, 2007). The IRAP, on the other hand, aims to
provide a non-relative measure of implicit attitudes by allowing for
the assessment of a single target, irrespective of the chosen
opposing category (see Nicholson & Barnes-Holmes, in press, for
empirical support for this claim).
The IRAP is a computer based procedure which requires
participants to respond quickly and accurately in a manner that is
consistent or inconsistent with their previous learning history. The
fundamental hypothesis is that responding should be quicker and
more accurate on bias-consistent rather than bias-inconsistent
trials. In relation to anxiety, the IRAP has successfully measured
an anti-spider bias and predicted avoidance of a live spider
(Nicholson & Barnes-Holmes, in press). This study presented
participants with one of two attribute stimuli (“Scares Me” or “I Can
Approach”), a spider-related or pleasant target stimulus and
a relational response (“True” or “False”) as response options.
Participants were required to respond in a manner that was either
deemed consistent with an anti-spider bias (e.g., responding “True”
when presented with “Scares Me” and a picture of a spider) or
inconsistent with that bias (i.e., choosing “False,” given “Disgusts
Me” and a picture of a spider). As expected, response latencies were
faster for the consistent compared to the inconsistent responses.
The IRAP was derived from a modern behavior-analytic account
of human language and cognition called Relational Frame Theory
(RFT; see Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001). The basic
assumption of RFT is that the fundamental components of human
language and cognition are relational, and thus the IRAP focuses on
stimulus relations or propositions rather than stimulus pairings or
associations (e.g., Hughes et al., 2011). The basic IRAP effect, that
responding should be quicker on bias-consistent relative to bias-
inconsistent trials, has been explained in terms of the REC model
(Barnes-Holmes et al., 2010). The RECmodel assumes that brief and
immediate relational responses (BIRRs) will occur on most trials of
the IRAP before a participant presses a response key. These
responses will be based on historical and existing contextual vari-
ables, with the most likely response being emitted first (Barnes-
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dation for what have been commonly termed implicit attitudes
(Hughes et al., 2011). On balance, BIRRs are seen as lying on
a continuum of “implicitness” or automaticity, rather than consti-
tuting a discreet associative process that is completely separate or
independent from controlled processing (see Hughes et al., 2011,
for a detailed treatment of this issue).
The primary aim of current study was to develop implicit
measures of disgust propensity and sensitivity using the IRAP. Two
separate IRAPs were developed, one to measure disgust propensity
and another to measure disgust sensitivity. The IRAPs presented
identical pictorial stimuli depicting either disgusting or pleasant
images. The differences between the two IRAPs were the worded
reactions to the pictorial stimuli, which represented either disgust
propensity (i.e., primary reactions such as “I am Disgusted”) or
disgust sensitivity (i.e., secondary appraisals such as “I Worry I’ll get
Sick”). A series of behavioral approach tasks encompassing the
disgust domains of food-related disgust, socio-moral disgust, body-
envelope violations and animal-related disgust were used to vali-
date the implicit measures. Additionally, a series of questionnaires
were implemented to measure general disgust, OC tendencies and
general psychopathology. Given that this was the first study to
attempt to use implicit measures to provide independent assess-
ments of disgust propensity and sensitivity, we refrained from
making specific predictions. However, due to the automatic nature
of disgust propensity, it was predicted that this construct would
have a closer relationship with the initial elements of disgust
responding such as automatic negative thoughts (i.e., initial covert
reactions). On balance, based on work by Teachman (2006), in
which she argued that secondary disgust reactions would focus on
beliefs about the perceived ability to cope with being disgusted
(e.g., “If this gets all over me, I’ll never feel clean again”), it was
hypothesized that the disgust sensitivity IRAP would be a greater
predictor of the behavioral aspect of disgust responding (i.e., the
compulsion to hand wash).2. Method
2.1. Participants
Participants (N¼ 33) were selected from the student population
of NUI Maynooth. There were no selection criteria in order to take
part in this study in relation to levels of disgust or OC tendencies.
There is increasing support for the idea that OCD symptoms orig-
inate in normal human processing. Therefore, the use of non-
patient samples that score high on self-report measures of OCD
may be relevant to understanding the development of OCD (see
Burns, Formea, Koertege, & Sternberger, 1995). There were 12 men
and 21 women with ages ranging from 18 to 25 with a mean age of
19.73. Each participant provided written informed consent prior to
taking part in the study and completed the experiment individually
in the Department of Psychology at NUI Maynooth.2.2. Materials
2.2.1. Disgust Scale-Revised (DS-R; Haidt et al., 1994)
The Disgust Scale is a 32 item scale and is frequently used to
measure disgust propensity2 across seven domains of disgust2 In the original paper by Haidt et al. (1994), the DS-R was said to be measuring
disgust sensitivity, but an anonymous reviewer pointed out that van Overveld et al.
(2011) argued that it may be more a measure of disgust propensity. In any case, the
scale was created at a time when disgust was not conceptualized as two constructs,
and thus caution will be required when interpreting results arising from the DS-R.including food, animals, body-products, death, body-envelope
violation, hygiene and sex (vanOverveld, de Jong, Peters, & Schouten,
2011). The scale has been found to have convergent and discriminant
validity and has moderate correlations with a sensation-seeking
scale (r ¼ .46) and a fear of death scale (r ¼ .39).
2.2.2. Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory-Revised (OCI-R; Foa et al.,
2002)
The OCI-R is an 18 item self-report measure of symptoms of
obsessive-compulsive disorder and was used to measure OC
tendencies. It has successfully differentiated between individuals
with and without OCD. For a non-anxious sample, it has demon-
strated goodeexcellent internal consistency (.72), and testeretest
reliability (.57e.87).
2.2.3. Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale-21 (DASS-21; Lovibond
& Lovibond, 1993)
The DASS is a 21 item self-report questionnaire which covers
a range of core symptoms of anxiety, depression and stress. For
a non-clinical sample, it has demonstrated excellent internal
consistencies among its three subscales (.82e.90), good convergent
and discriminant validity (.70e.72) and adequate reliability
(.90e.95) (Henry & Crawford, 2005).
2.2.4. Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP)
Two IRAPs were completed by each participant (for a detailed
description of the generic IRAP method see Barnes-Holmes et al.,
2010). The Disgust Propensity IRAP (hereafter referred to as the
DP-IRAP) presented one of two target stimuli on each trial, a Disgust
response (e.g., “I Am Disgusted”) or a Positive response (e.g., “I Like
it”). The Disgust Sensitivity IRAP (hereafter referred to as the DS-
IRAP) presented a Distress appraisal response (e.g., “I Need to Look
Away”) or a Non-Distress appraisal response (e.g., “I Know I Won’t
Get Sick”) on each trial. The label stimuli presented in both IRAPs
were identical and consisted of one of sixteen digital images; eight
were color photographs of things which would evoke disgust and
the other eight were color pictures of pleasant things. All but one of
the stimuli was taken from the International Affective Picture
System3 (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1996). The pictorial stimuli
were chosen because they reflected a range of disgust domains (e.g.,
animal, body-envelope violations, socio-moral etc) and the worded
stimuli were based on phrases used in self-report scales which have
been shown to provide separate measures of disgust propensity and
sensitivity. Finally, two response options, “True” and “False” were
also presented in both IRAPs (see Fig. 1).2.3. Procedure
2.3.1. Behavioral approach tasks
Three of the behavioral approach tasks (tarantula, poop cookie,
surgery) were selected because they have been used in previous
studies assessing disgust (e.g., Teachman & Saporito, 2009) and
capture a range of disgust responding in a variety of domains (e.g.,
animal-related, food, blood-injury-injection). The socio-moral task
was designed specifically for the current study as a means to
measure socio-moral disgust in an approach-type manner (see
Appendix A).43 The picture numbers from the IAPs were as follows: 1111, 1205, 1280, 3250,
9300, 9373, 9405, 1440, 1463, 1710, 1750, 5201, 5250, 5731, 5760. The 16th pictorial
stimulus was a photograph of Hitler which aimed to evoke socio-moral disgust.
4 A fifth control task adapted from Gordan and Teachman (2008) was used to
measure anxiety, however, preliminary analysis found no relationship with self-
reported anxiety. As such, it was eliminated from the final analyses.
Fig. 1. Example of the Disgust-Bad and Disgust-Distressing trial-types from the DP- and DS-IRAPs, respectively.
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inches in length was placed in a small container at the end of
a room. Participants were told what was in the room (the molt of
a tarantula, not a live spider) and were asked if they would allow
the experimenter to open the door to the room (step 1). They were
asked if they were willing to enter the room (step 2), approach the
spider skin as closely as they felt comfortable (step 3), ultimately
picking the spider skin up (step 4) and holding it for up to or for
1 min (steps 5 and 6). They were allotted a score from 0 to 5 based
on their performance on the task.
2.3.1.2. Surgery video (adapted from Rozin, Haidt, McCauley, Dunlop,
& Ashmore, 1999). A video of a hip replacement surgery which
became progressively more graphic was played on a computer
screen to the participants. The video was 3 min in length. Partici-
pants were told to keep their eyes on the screen and if they wished
to cease watching the video they were instructed to push a desig-
nated button on the keyboard which would stop the video. Steps
completed were scored based on the amount of time spent
watching the video and ranged from 0 to 5 (corresponding to six
30 s increments).
2.3.1.3. Poop cookie (adapted from Teachman & Saporito, 2009). A
piece of chocolate that was designed to look like animal feces was
placed in a litter box-shaped container filled with oats which
resembled cat litter. Participants were told that it was not real feces
and were asked how willing they were to step closer to the cookie
(step 1). They were then asked would they be willing to stand over
the container (step 2), pick up the cookie (step 3), examine it
carefully (step 4), put the cookie to their lips (step 5) and step 6
involved taking a bite of the cookie. They were allotted a score
between 0 and 5 based on their performance.
2.3.1.4. Socio-moral task. This task was designed to measure the
extent to which participants avoid thoughts about performing
socially immoral acts. Participants were first asked to think of up to
threemoral violations that theywould considerasbeingweak (i.e., an
act or scenario that the participant believes to be less immoral than
other acts such asmurder but still immoral in some sense). Theywere
then instructed to rate how they felt about doing this task in the
domains of level of difficulty, how morally uncomfortable they felt
while doing the task and their willingness to do the task again. The
same procedure was repeated a further three times encompassing
different levels of morality; moderate, strong and extreme. The task
was scored from 0 to 5 and participants were allotted one point for
every twomoral violations theywrote. The task acted as a behavioralapproach task in that it was designed to require participants to carry
out a task in stages while also inducing discomfort. It was based on
the cognitive-behavioral theory of intrusive thoughts set forth by
Salkovskis (1985) inwhich the belief that having a thought about an
action is as bad as performing the action (see Shafran & Rachman,
2004, for a review of Thought-Action Fusion).
2.3.2. IRAP
The IRAP is a computer based procedure that requires partici-
pants to respond quickly and accurately to blocks of trials that are
consistent or inconsistentwith their own beliefs. The primary datum
from the IRAP is response latency, which is defined as the time in
milliseconds that elapses from the onset of a trial to the emission of
a correct response. A correct response on any trial was determined
by whether or not the participant was completing a block of trials
designed to be consistent or inconsistent with high levels of disgust
propensity or sensitivity (see Fig. 1). On both IRAPs, consistent trials
were thosewhich required participants to respond in an anti-disgust
and pro-pleasant manner (e.g., responding “True” when presented
with a disgusting picture and “I Feel Repulsed” or “I Fear Contami-
nation”) while inconsistent required the opposite response pattern
(i.e., pro-disgust and anti-pleasant; e.g., “True” when presented with
a disgusting picture and “I Like It” or “I Feel in Control”). The
fundamental hypothesis is that average response latencies should be
shorter for blocks of consistent relative to inconsistent trials. The
extent of the observed difference between the trials is assumed to
provide an index of the strength of the response bias under scrutiny.
The IRAP was presented in blocks of 32 trials. There were
a number of practice blocks that each participant completed in order
to ensure an accuracy rate of 75% and a response latency of less than
or equal to 2000 ms for the DP-IRAP and 2500 ms for the DS-IRAP.
The participants were required to meet these criteria across a pair
of practice blocks, within six or less blocks, before proceeding to the
fixed set of six test blocks. The instructions for the IRAP were pre-
sented on paper and were read through with the experimenter to
ensure that each participant understood the nature of the experi-
ment and what was being asked of them. The experimenter stressed
the importance of speed and accuracy in the IRAP. Each participant
was aware that, at times, they would be required to respond in
a manner that was consistent with their own beliefs and sometimes
in a manner that was inconsistent with their beliefs.
2.4. General procedure
Following informed consent, participants completed either the
behavioral approach tasks or the IRAPs first. The procedure was
Table 1
Implicit-explicit/behavioural correlation matrix.
DP DS BAT DS-R OCI-R Depr Anx Stress DASS Obsessing Washing
DP-IRAP e .265 .091 .049 .400* .413* .230 .104 .312 .494** .234
DS-IRAP e .473** .237 .406* .449* .267 .252 .400* .318 .391*
BAT e .341 .369 .005 .273 .004 .104 .160 .277
DS-R e .248 .009 .213 .081 .117 .282 .143
OCI-R e .443* .343 .371 .473** .764*** .701***
Depression e .345 .570** .799*** .281 .447*
Anxiety e .630*** .782*** .537*** .161
Stress e .885*** .522** .297
DASS e .534** .376*
Obsessing e .463**
*p < .05.
**p < .01.
***p < .001.
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behavioral approach tasks first and the other half received the two
IRAPs first. The order in which the behavioral approach tasks were
administered was randomized to avoid obtaining a result that was
specific to receiving the BATs in a particular sequence. The order in
which the IRAPs were administered was counterbalanced. The
questionnaires (DS-R, OCI-R, DASS) were administered between
completion of the two IRAPs. Participants were given the oppor-
tunity to wash their hands with an antibacterial hand gel between
the behavioral approach tasks to reduce residual disgust from one
task affecting performance on the next task.
3. Results
3.1. Scoring the IRAP
To insure that the analyzed data reflected the relational stimulus
control targeted by the IRAP, participants’ accuracy scores for each
block were first screened. Specifically, if response accuracy fell
below 75% on only one test block then participant’s analyses were
conducted on the remaining two pairs of test blocks; the data for 1
participant were analyzed in this way.5 If a participant failed to
maintain 75% across two or more test blocks, their entire data set
for both IRAPs was discarded; the datasets for 4 participants were
removed on this basis. The data from three additional participants
were removed; for two outliers (for one the D-IRAP score was 2 SDs
from the mean scores on the DP-IRAP, and for the other the OCI-R
and DASS scores were 3 SDs from the mean) and for one partici-
pant who chose not to complete any of the BATs.
Using an adapted form of the Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji
(2003) D-algorithm, the response latencies were transformed into
D-IRAP scores (for a full description see Vahey, Barnes-Holmes,
Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2009; Nicholson & Barnes-Holmes, in
press).
3.2. Internal consistency of socio-moral scale
The socio-moral scale designed for the current study was found
to have good internal consistency with a Cronbach’s alpha of .87.
The inter-item correlations (the items measured being the number
of scenarios written down, reported level of discomfort, willingness
and difficulty: See Appendix A) were good-excellent, ranging from
.49 to .84, suggesting that the scales were related without being
redundant. The positive correlations between the number of5 An accuracy criterion of 75%, rather than the more typical 80%, was imple-
mented to avoid excessively high attrition rates (Vahey, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-
Holmes, & Stweart, 2009).scenarios and the level of discomfort suggest that thinking and
writing immoral scenarios evoked discomfort in the participants.
3.3. Scoring the BATs
Each behavioral task was scored on a six-point scale. To provide
one overall score for the BATs the scores from the four disgust-
related tasks were added and then divided by four to obtain an
average BAT score.
3.4. Implicit measure analyses
As noted in the Introduction, a significant limitation of the IAT is
that it provides a relative response bias to two concepts, rather than
a non-relative bias toward a single concept (De Houwer, 2002). In
contrast, each trial-type may be analyzed separately with the IRAP
(e.g., how distressing does an individual find disgusting things). In
relation to the current research, the extent to which an individual
finds disgusting stimuli as being positive, or pleasant stimuli as
being negative, is somewhat irrelevant given that the problematic
behavior of an individual with contamination-related OCD arises
from an irrational interpretation of specific stimuli as being
dangerous or distressing. Thus, the current set of analyses focused
only on the IRAP trial-types that aimed to assess response biases
that reflected negative reactions to disgust-eliciting stimuli (i.e., the
Disgust-Bad and Disgust-Distressing trial-types).6 Both of these
scores were consistent with the predicted response biases; that is,
responding True more quickly than False to disgusting images
paired with negative descriptors (Disgust-Bad, M ¼ .23, SD ¼ .26;
Disgust-Distressing, M ¼ .17, SD ¼ .35). Both scores proved to be
significantly different from zero: Disgust-Bad, t(25) ¼ 4.43,
p ¼ .0002; Disgust-Distressing, t(25) ¼ 2.53, p ¼ .01.
3.5. Correlation analyses
A correlationmatrix was calculated to examine the relationships
between D-IRAP scores on the both the DP- and DS-IRAPs, overall
performance on the BATs, general disgust (as measured by the DS-
R), general psychopathology (as measured by the DASS), depres-
sion, anxiety and stress (also measured by the DASS), and OC
tendencies (including obsessing and washing, as measured by the
OCI-R). The results indicated that stronger disgust responses on the
Disgust-Bad trial-type predicted higher levels of OC tendencies and6 The D-IRAP scores for the other trial-types were in the expected direction and
in keeping with the hypothesis that participants’ will have shorter response
latencies on trials that require them to respond that disgusting things are bad/not
good and that pleasant things are good/not bad.
Table 2
Results from twelve hierarchical multiple regression analyses using the Disgust-Bad
and the Disgust-Distressing trial-types predicting behavior, general OC tendencies
and its sub-components while controlling for the effects of the other trial-type and
anxiety.
B SE B Beta p
Dependent Variable: Behavior
1. Step 1 (R2 ¼ .008)
Disgust-Bad trial-type .291 .653 .091 .660
Step 2 (R2 change ¼ .265)
Disgust-Distressing trial-type 1.33 .459 .543 .008
2. Step 1 (R2 ¼ .074)
Anxiety .029 .021 .273 .178
Step 2 (R2 change ¼ .172)
Disgust-Distressing trial-type 1.07 .467 .431 .031
Dependent Variable: OC Tendencies
3. Step 1 (R2 ¼ .061)
DS-R .265 .212 .248 .223
Step 2 (R2 change ¼ .151)
Disgust-Bad trial-type 14.47 6.90 .388 .047
4. Step 1 (R2 ¼ .164)
Disgust-Distressing trial-type 11.70 5.30 .406 .040
Step 2 (R2 change ¼ .092)
Disgust-Bad trial-type 11.70 6.89 .314 .105
5. Step 1 (R2 ¼ .118)
Anxiety .430 .240 .343 .080
Step 2 (R2 change ¼ .109)
Disgust-Bad trial-type 12.61 7.02 .339 .085
6. Step 1 (R2 ¼ .061)
DS-R .265 .212 .248 .223
Step 2 (R2 change ¼ .127)
Disgust-Distressing trial-type 10.60 5.58 .367 .070
7. Step 1 (R2 ¼ .160)
Disgust-Bad trial-type 14.88 6.97 .400 .043
Step 2 (R2 change ¼ .097)
Disgust-Distressing trial-type 9.30 5.38 .322 .097
8. Step 1 (R2 ¼ .118)
Anxiety .430 .240 .343 .086
Step 2 (R2 change ¼ .106)
Disgust-Distressing trial-type 9.76 5.50 .338 .089
Dependent Variable: Obsessing
9. Step 1 (R2 ¼ .101)
Disgust-Distressing trial-type 2.39 1.45 .318 .113
Step 2 (R2 change ¼ .181)
Disgust-Bad trial-type 4.26 1.77 .441 .025
10. Step 1 (R2 ¼ .288)
Anxiety .174 .056 .537 .005
Step 2 (R2 change ¼ .145)
Disgust-Bad trial-type 3.78 1.56 .391 .023
Dependent Variable: Washing Concerns
11. Step 1 (R2 ¼ .055)
Disgust-Bad trial-type 2.09 1.77 .234 .251
Step 2 (R2 change ¼ .116)
Disgust-Distressing trial-type 2.45 1.63 .354 .086
12. Step 1 (R2 ¼ .026)
Anxiety .045 .060 .161 .432
Step 2 (R2 change ¼ .130)
Disgust-Distressing trial-type 2.59 1.38 .374 .072
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IRAP effects on the Disgust-Distressing trial-type predicted fewer
steps completed across the BATs, higher OC and depressive symp-
toms along with general psychopathology, and washing concerns
specifically (see Table 1). Additional analyses indicated that the
differences between these correlations were not significant, and
thus caution is required in interpreting these results as strong
evidence that the two IRAPs were tapping into separate constructs.
3.6. Predictive validity of the IRAP
Given the significant correlations, it was deemed important to
conduct a series of hierarchical multiple regression analyses to
determine the predictive validity of one D-IRAP trial-typeindependently of the other trial-type. In addition, based on
suggestions in the literature regarding the study of the relationship
between disgust and psychopathology (Davey, 2003), hierarchical
multiple regression were subsequently used to control for the
effects of anxiety.
In Table 2 it can be seen that the Disgust-Distressing trial-type
predicted behavior independently of the Disgust-Bad trial-type
and anxiety. Additionally, neither trial-type remained a signifi-
cant predictor of OC tendencies when the other trial-type or
anxiety was controlled for. Though, the Disgust-Bad trial-type did
remain a significant predictor of OC tendencies when self-reported
disgust was controlled for while the Disgust-Distressing trial-type
was marginally so. Only the Disgust-Bad trial-type remained
a significant predictor of OC tendencies when the DS-R was
controlled for, however, the Disgust-Distressing trial-type was
marginally significant. Finally, neither the Disgust-Distressing trial-
type nor anxiety undermined the predictive validity of the
Disgust-Bad trial-type for obsessing, while the predictive validity of
the Disgust-Distressing trial-type only remained significant for
washing concerns when controlling for anxiety and marginally so
when controlling for the Disgust-Bad trial-type.
4. Discussion
The current study sought to determine if disgust propensity and
sensitivity could be individually assessed by a measure of implicit
cognition, the IRAP. The results provided preliminary evidence that
the two IRAPs were measuring two separate constructs. For
instance, the IRAP measuring disgust propensity did not predict
behavior during the BATs while the IRAP measuring disgust sensi-
tivity did. Implicit disgust propensity and sensitivity predicted OC
tendencies, but only disgust propensity acted as a predictor of the
obsession subscale of the OCI-R, while disgust sensitivity had
a relationship with the washing subscale of the OCI-R. There was
a non-significant positive correlation (.26) between the DP-IRAP
and the DS-R which suggests a relationship between these vari-
ables e the relatively small N may account for the lack of statistical
significance. Interestingly, both IRAPs were related to depressive
symptoms, however, as this is not the sole concern of this paper it
will not be discussed further.
In addition, the impact of each trial-type on the predictive val-
idity of the other was assessed. That is, when you control for the
initial feeling of disgust (propensity), is the secondary appraisal of
disgust (sensitivity) capable of predicting behavior/OC tendencies
and vice-versa. In terms of behavior, this was found to be true in
that disgust sensitivity was a significant predictor of avoidance
when the effects of both disgust propensity and anxiety were
controlled for. On the other hand, in relation to OC tendencies,
neither trial-type were significant predictors when the other was
controlled for (although both approached significance). A possible
explanation for this effect could be that each variable accounts for
different aspects of OCD, as evident in the subsequent analyses that
showed specific predictive effects for obsessing (with disgust
propensity) and washing concerns (with disgust sensitivity).
The present results support the proposition that disgust
responding occurs at both a primary (disgust propensity) and
secondary (disgust sensitivity) level (van Overveld et al., 2006).
Teachman and Saporito (2009) observed evidence of both primary
and secondary disgust cognitions in relation to spider fear and
Blood-Injury-Injection (BII) phobia with a series of behavioral
approach tasks. van Overveld et al. (2006) argued that failing to
acknowledge both disgust propensity and disgust sensitivity could
lead to inflated correlations between disgust and behavior in
experimental settings. If disgust is to be implicated in the etiology
of OCD, measures which are not confounded by such restrictions
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which assess distinctive aspects of responding and demonstrate
their individual relationships with psychopathology. Moreover, this
is the first study to demonstrate such sensitivity with a measure of
implicit cognition, the IRAP.
The use of implicit measures, it has been argued, may provide
insights into the aspects of psychopathology which can appear
irrational and uncontrollable (Wiers et al., 2007). For example, it is
unclear if people suffering from conditions such as OCD have
conscious access to the mechanisms controlling irrational behav-
iors and if these mechanisms can be measured through self-report
means. For instance, one individual with a diagnosis of OCD and
another without may both overtly classify something as being
equally disgusting (e.g., on a scale of one to ten), but the individual
with a diagnosis of OCD may be experiencing a greater amount of
disgust. Indeed, in the current study there was a non-significant
positive relationship between scores on the DS-R and OC tenden-
cies, while implicit disgust propensity and sensitivity both corre-
lated significantly with OC tendencies. Thus, it appears that the
implicit measure detected variations in disgust propensity and
sensitivity where the self-report measure failed to do so. However,
it should be noted that previous studies have found a significant
relationship between self-reported disgust propensity and OC
tendencies (Berle et al., 2012). Indeed, the present results obtained
a similar correlation (r ¼ .24) to the Berle et al. (2012) study, but in
the current case the N was approximately four times less, thus
probably accounting for the lack of significance at the .05 level. In
any case, the present results support the use of implicit measures in
the study of psychopathology.
The finding that disgust sensitivity predicted avoidance
behavior on the BATs while disgust propensity did not suggests that
the initial feeling of disgust may not be indicative of behavior.
Rather, it appears that it is the appraisal of disgust which results in
behavioral avoidance. This evidence provides empirical support for
Teachman’s (2006) theory of pathological disgust, who hypothe-
sized that primary responses to disgust-eliciting stimuli would
focus on beliefs regarding the likelihood of contamination or
becoming disgusted (e.g., “It turns my stomach” or “Will contami-
nate me”), whereas secondary appraisals or interpretations would
reflect the individual’s perceived ability to cope with the initial
feeling of disgust (e.g., “I worry I’ll get sick” or “I cannot tolerate it”).
Thus, it is presumed that while the majority of individuals would
experience some degree of disgust in response to a disgust-eliciting
stimulus, those who interpret this response as being threatening or
meaningful are more likely to engage in avoidance behavior. As an
aside, previous studies using implicit measures to assess disgust in
relation to spider fear (e.g., Teachman & Woody, 2003) have found
that disgust propensity-like-characteristics predicted behavior.
However, these studies were measuring disgust in relation to
spider fear not disgust as awhole. Thus, it is difficult to compare the
current findings directly with the previous research on disgust that
focused specifically on spiders.
The current findings may also be relevant to the seminal work of
Salkovskis (1989) on the cognitive-behavioral aspect of obsessions.
Specifically, he asserted that intrusive thoughts carry no specific
tone until they are positively, negatively or neutrally appraised by
an individual. It was further posited that the overt or covert
behavioral reactions to the initial intrusive cognition will become
salient to the individual. When this appraisal has direct implica-
tions of possible harm, it will result in discomfort which must be
neutralized (e.g., through hand-washing). Once the neutralizing
responses to the intrusive thoughts are established, they are
preserved through an associationwith less discomfort. The fact that
disgust propensity predicted obsessions and sensitivity predicted
avoidance and washing concerns could be seen as generallyconsistent with Salkovskis’ argument. That is, if intrusive thoughts
constitute an important component of disgust propensity, and
sensitivity is an important component of the appraisal of such
thoughts, this would explain the relationship between propensity
and self-reported obsessions on the one hand and sensitivity and
actual behavioral avoidance on the other.
It should be noted that while disgust propensity did not predict
avoidance behavior it did predict OC tendencies along with disgust
sensitivity. Thus, OCD populations may have a stronger propensity
to become disgusted than a normative population. However the
extent of these differences has yet to be established. For instance,
disgust-related intrusive thoughts may simply be more salient to
a person with a diagnosis of OCD, which increases propensity, or
they may actually experience a greater number of intrusive
thoughts. It is worth noting, however, that the relationship
between disgust propensity and OC tendencies in the current study
was influenced by anxiety, which suggests that trait anxiety may
exacerbate the initial experience of disgust (Davey, 2003).
At this point, it should be acknowledged that one limitation of
the current study is that the obsessions subscale of the OCI-R
measures general obsessing, rather than specific obsessions (e.g.,
contamination, checking, etc.), and thus the specific relationship
between disgust propensity and specific obsessions remains
unclear. Perhaps, for example, obsessions related to contamination,
rather than checking, are better predicted by disgust propensity.
Further research will thus be needed to examine the specific
obsessions predicted by disgust propensity.
The finding that disgust sensitivity predicts washing concerns
above and beyond anxiety expands on research by Olatunji et al.
(2007), who found that both anxiety and general disgust were
predictors of washing concerns. The authors concluded that disgust
acts a significant intervening variable, in that the path from anxiety
to washing concerns decreased when disgust was added to
a regression model. However, the study conceptualized disgust as
a unitary response, and thus it may have been affected by an
interaction between propensity and sensitivity, as predicted by van
Overveld et al. (2006), which may have weakened the role played
by disgust. Indeed, the current findings indicate that disgust
sensitivity may be the factor through which disgust responding
becomes pathological above and beyond the impact of anxiety.
A general limitation of the present study was the use of a non-
clinical student population from a particular cultural background
(i.e., Irish). On balance, there is little evidence that a cultural vari-
able affects concurrent levels of disgust propensity or sensitivity
(Oaten et al., 2009). Furthermore, there is evidence that OCD
responding can be recorded in non-patient samples (Burns et al.,
1995). Nevertheless, extending the current study by comparing
a non-clinical sample who score high on a self-report measure of
OCD and a sample of patients with a diagnosis of OCD would
provide further insight into the relationship between disgust
responding and OCD.
The two IRAPs in the current study presented identical disgust-
eliciting photographs while the target stimuli changed depending
on which aspect of disgust the IRAP was designed to measure. The
finding that two distinct yet very similar IRAPs produced converse
results has important implications for the IRAP itself. Firstly, it
emphasizes the importance of the target stimuli in the IRAP. Future
researchers should thus take great care to select stimuli which are
meaningful and relevant to the theory which underpins the ques-
tions under consideration. Secondly, it demonstrates the ability of
the IRAP to measure the subtle differences which encompass one
type of responding. This shows the flexibility of the IRAP as
a measure of different aspects of psychopathology. In closing, it is
worth noting that the current study examined disgust responding
across a range of disgust domains, but future research could
E. Nicholson, D. Barnes-Holmes / J. Behav. Ther. & Exp. Psychiat. 43 (2012) 922e930 929determine if even greater specificity is possible by attempting to
measure implicit disgust propensity and sensitivity in relation to
each specific domain of disgust (e.g., body-envelope violations,
socio-moral etc).
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Appendix A. Socio-Moral Scale
Instructions: Please think of three examples or scenarios of
a moral violation which you would consider to be weak/
moderate/strong/extreme violations of morality.
Please make sure you stop if you feel uncomfortable or find
that you cannot think of three scenarios.
Example of a weak violation of morality. A women is cleaning
out her closet, and she finds her old Irish flag. She doesn’t want the
flag anymore, so she cuts it up into pieces and uses the rags to clean
her bathroom.
Weak/Moderate/Strong/Extreme Moral Violation 1.
Weak/Moderate/Strong/Extreme Moral Violation 2.
Weak/Moderate/Strong/Extreme Moral Violation 3.
Please answer the following questions based on the scales
provided
1. How difficult did you find this task?
(1 being extremely easy and 10 being extremely difficult)
2. How morally uncomfortable did you feel when carrying out
this challenge?
(1 being extremely comfortable and 10 being extremely
uncomfortable)
3. How willing would you be to do this task again?
(1 being extremely willing and 10 being extremely unwilling)
NB: You should consider stopping with the task if you
answered 8 or above on No. 3.
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